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Abstract
This analysis focuses on how the European Union (EU) succeeded in bringing the
International Accounting Standards (IAS) to being accepted as the international accounting
standards. It overcame resistances mainly from the U.S. which considered its accounting stan-
dards, US GAAP, to be the superior ones and had been reluctant in supporting EU’s attempt of
this. Michael L. Katz’s and Carl Shapiro’s model of network externalities is conceptually
applied to this case. First, EU regulated all EU listed companies to use IAS from 2005
onwards. Second, it announced that it would apply this regulation to non EU companies from
2007 onwards. Non EU companies were regulated not to have access to EU financial markets
for raising capital unless they make financial reporting, using the accounting standards which
EU would consider to be equivalent to the standards it uses. This gave a big push to non IAS
using countries to switching to adopting IAS, making IAS de facto international accounting
standards. This maneuver of EU had what Katz and Shapiro called “a strategic, first-mover
advantage.” The analysis covers developments only until early part of 2008 and does not cover
developments after the global financial crisis of 2008.
Introduction
This analysis focuses on how EU succeeded in bringing IAS, renamed the International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) after 2001, to being endorsed as the international
accounting standards, overcoming resistances mainly from the U.S. which considered its own
standards, the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures (US GAAP), to be the leading
standards in the world and stuck to asking the International Accounting Standards Committee
(the IASC) to set stricter standards for its endorsement of IAS.
The international accounting standards are public goods because they constitute the indis-
pensable infrastructure for the world economy. As a result of ever-growing financial globaliza-
tion, the accounting standards for financial reporting among different countries and a region
had to be converged into the single ones, solo and common rules, so that all companies in the
world can raise capital on any financial market across borders. For these requirements to be
met, the standards should possess a core set of standards, secure cross-border comparability,
and give transparency and full disclosures in addition to being of high quality. Therefore,
though they have been set by the IASC which is the non-governmental standards setter (NGO)
and was renamed the International Accounting Standards Board (the IASB) after 2001,
IAS/IFRS are de facto international accounting rules, if they are endorsed in the world.
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The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) endorsed the IASC
and IAS in May 2000. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC), Agency of
Financial Services of Japan, and national regulators of many other countries are members of
IOSCO. Therefore, IOSCO’s endorsement of May 2000 gave authorization to IAS. Their rela-
tionships are cross- level cooperation across IGO and NGO.
Similar endorsement mechanism exists within each country. The SEC entrusts the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (the FASB) with setting accounting standards. The for-
mer authorizes US GAAP set by the latter. Similar relationships exist between national regula-
tors and non-governmental standards setters. In case of EU, it regulated all listed EU compa-
nies to use IAS/IFRS.
There had been other levels of interactions. Interests of major economies conflicted over
what conditions IAS/IFRS had to meet for their endorsement, though all agreed on the need of
convergence of their accounting standards in order to meet the challenges of financial global-
ization. They wanted their standards to be well reflected in the international standards. At
international level, the European Commission (EC) Commissioner of Financial Services, the
SEC, Agency of Financial Services of Japan, and other national regulators interacted in pur-
suit of national and regional interests. At non governmental level, private setters of the U.S.
and Japan negotiated with the IASB over how to achieve convergence of their standards with
IAS/IFRS.
Furthermore, interactions at inter-governmental level between national regulators very
closely interrelated with interactions at non governmental level between private setters such as
the FASB and the IASB. For example, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (the
CESR) negotiated with the SEC over how to remove their mutual entry barriers into their mar-
kets, while EU-backed IASB negotiated with the FASB over how to reduce differences in their
standards to achieve convergence. Interactions at three different levels: (1) IOSCO-IASC; (2)
EC Commissioner–the SEC; and (3) EU-backed IASC–the SEC-backed FASB had taken
place. Especially, the latter two levels of interactions had been closely interrelated. They had
jointly produced de facto international accounting rules. When regulators of major economic
powers endorsed IAS/IFRS as recommended by IOSCO, IAS/IFRS became the international
standards and became the de facto rules. They had got authorization and got binding power like
international rules. After adopting IAS/IFRS, each national regulators regulates companies of
its country to file financial reporting in accordance with IAS/IFRS. IAS/IFRS thus get bind-
ing power to companies throughout the world through regulatory power of national regulators
of adopting countries.
This was the quite unique case of how de facto international rules had evolved in the form
of convergence of national standards into IAS/IFRS. In the era of global governance, the rule
of law is going to be sought ever more. This is one of the most successful cases of this kind.
EU had taken critical lead in this attempt. Its strategy had “a strategic, first-mover advantage”
by adopting IAS/IFRS to elevate them into the place of  the de facto international standards
and then by negotiating to get them endorsed by the U.S. in order to put them in place as the
official international standards through effective exploitation of its scale advantage of the size
of integrated market to a maximum extent (Katz and Shapiro, 1986, p. 825). This dexterous
maneuver by EU is here analyzed with the concept of network externalities.
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I. Review of Studies
Growing attention has been recently paid to standards setting in various fields, especially,
industrial standards. Global economic integration has necessitated convergence of different
national standards across borders. Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe identify two different
approaches to international standardization, political realism and “sociological institutional-
ism (the world society approach)”. In the realist approach, analysis is focused on which player
between the two key coordinating ones takes the first move in setting the international stan-
dards. Once the first mover takes advantage in setting the standards, the second mover has to
follow suit, paying the one-time switching costs. This disparity in payoffs derives from the
nature of the coordination game, represented by the battle of sexes. 
In the battle of sexes-type game, there are two players, Row and Column in Mattli’ and
Büthe’s case. Each has two standards to choose, X and Y. When we match up each of Row’s
choices with each of Column’s choices in a two x two matrix, we get four combinations of
their choices and their payoffs are arranged to be XX (4, 3), XY(2,2), YX(1,1), and
YY(3,4). (The first payoffs in parentheses are for Row and the second ones are for Column).
There are two equilibriums: XX and YY. However, Row prefers XX to YY, while Column
prefers YY to XX. It is therefore not easy to coordinate their choices because of this distribu-
tional conflict involved. In the coordination game of international standards setting, the player
who makes the first move has the first mover advantage. Usually, the more powerful one
between the two key players makes the first move and the second one has to follow suit, pay-
ing the one-time switching costs. It is the U.S. that has made the first move in most of
cases(Mattli and Büthe, 2003, p. 4 , p. 17, and pp. 9-11).
According to Mattli and Büthe, “the sociological institutionalist world society approach”
thinks that “standards are primarily a function of science and technical considerations rather
than a function of the distribution of power between national, regional, or nonstate actors”.  In
this view, “technical rationality trumps power” in standards setting(Mattli and Büthe, 2003, p.
13). Payoffs of four combinations of Row’s and Column’s choices in a two x two matrix are
arranged to be XX (4, 4), XY (2, 1), YX (1, 2), and YY(3,3). “Under these circumstances,
coordination is easy―though still not automatic since there are two equilibriums (XX and
YY) and no dominant strategy. Institution may help by providing a forum for the exchange of
information, so as to  ensure, that the other player, too, considers X technically superior”
(Mattli and Büthe, 2003, pp. 9-10).
Beth A. Simmons, taking more likely the realist approach in terms of Mattli and Büthe,
constructs a framework to identify four typologies of the U.S. approaches as the first mover in
setting the international financial regulation by combining two dimensions. One is significant
negative externalities or insignificant negative externalities. Negative externalities are defined
in Simmons terms here to be the cost arising from non-conforming by other countries to the
international regulation the U.S. sets. The other is high incentives to emulate or low incentives
to emulate the standards which the U.S. sets as the first mover. Simmons assumes that the U.S.
has taken the first move out of its domestic necessities deriving from its size of domestic
economy: “The size of the internal U.S. market gives U.S. regulators as incentive to make uni-
lateral regulatory decisions, even if foreign regulators do not follow suit. The United States is
‘hegemonic’ in the sense that it is costlier to alter its preferred regulatory innovation than to try
to change the policies of the rest of the world” (Simmons, 2001, p. 595). If other countries do
not adopt the international regulation it sets, their resistance constitutes negative externalities
to the U.S. However, the U.S. “has already determined that the regulatory innovation supports
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its own domestic interest, no combination of responses by the rest of the world’s regulators
will cause it to alter its own internal regulatory stance” (Simmons, 2001, p. 597).
The harmonization of the international accounting standards is the case falling into the
category with the combination of insignificant negative externalities and high incentives to
emulate the standards the U.S. sets. As the reasons for high incentives to emulate, Simmons
points out that in the international accounting standards, US GAAP have been the dominant
standards largely because of the scale of its financial markets and that any multinational cor-
poration which wanted to raise capital on the U.S. markets had to use US GAAP (Simmons,
2001, p. 610). Simmons, however, covers analysis up until mid 2001 at most and misses EC’s
maneuver from 2000 onwards to reverse this trend. 
Similarly, Stavros Gadinis uses domestic source of influence to explain what policy
response a certain state takes in coordinating the international financial regulation, assuming
that demands of domestic constituents such as financial firms and innumerable number of
investors affect strongly policy responses of the state. He constructs a framework to classify
policy coordination by combining two dimensions. One is “strong dominance” or “contested
dominance.”  The other is “centralized market” or “decentralized market.” The combination of
strong dominance and centralized market is the category where coordination over the interna-
tional accounting standards fits into (Gadinis, 2008, p. 446). Financial markets for issuing
stocks and for trading them are heavily concentrated, “centralized,” in the U.S. The U.S. domi-
nance in markets is strong in terms both of “the share” the U.S. financial industry occupies
and “the wealth available for investment within the state’s borders” (Gadinis, 2008, p. 445).  In
such a position that the U.S. occupies in the international accounting standards, coordination
takes place in which EU companies, for example, approach EC to converge their standards
with US GAAP in order to secure access to the dominant U.S. markets for issuing stocks and
for listing them on exchanges. This is because the U.S. requires foreign companies to recon-
cile their financial reporting to US GAAP. Because of this dominant position, the U.S. insists
that “the differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS be reduced to a minimum (i.e., insisting
that IFRS obtain virtually the same content as U.S. GAAP) before the reconciliation require-
ment could be dropped” (Gadinis, 2008, pp. 471-473).
Both Simmons and Gadinis use domestic source of influence as the key variable to
explain what policy responses states, presumably the U.S. and EU, take in coordinating the
international accounting standards. However, what an outcome in coordinating the interna-
tional financial accountings comes out also depends on international bargaining processes
themselves.  While capturing the critical aspects in coordination of the international account-
ing standards, their analyses seem to leave out the aspect of international bargaining process-
es. This paper picks up an analysis where they leave out, i.e., international bargaining process-
es. There seems to be another factor which should be further considered.  The London Stock
Exchange (the LSE) has the non-negligible presence as the alternative market for issuing
stocks and for listing them on exchanges. Its presence likely would have had more influence
upon the U.S. as a source of competitive pressure from markets, if it had kept taking unilater-
alism in  convergence of the international accounting standards. Gadinis’s notions of “strong
dominance” and “centralized market” seem to be a little bit too strong. While focusing on
domestic sources for the U.S. strategies, both seem to put less emphasis on the effects of
financial globalization upon the U.S. strategies. 
There seems to be a particularly important aspect of convergence of the international
accounting standards.  There is an emerging concept of “Global Administrative Law”. By this,
Michael S. Barr and Geoffrey P. Miller mean: “The basic contention is that there is or ought to
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be, a global administrative law that governs the conduct of international entities and national
governments in international matters, and in some way responds to the normative desire,
shared in many ways with domestic administrative law, for accountability, fairness, protection
of individual rights, and some sense of domestic decision-making” (Barr and Miller, 2006, p.
16). Niko Krish and Benedict Kingsbury point out:
Globalization and rise of global governance are transforming the structure of interna-
tional law, . . . soft forms of rule-making are even more wide spread, . . . Global
administrative law . . . approaches cognate changes from particular angle. It starts
from the observation that much of global governance can be understood as regulation
and administration, and that we are witnessing the emergence of a ‘global administra-
tive space’: a space in which the strict dichotomy between domestic and international
has largely broken down, in which administrative functions are performed in often
complex interplays between officials and institutions on different levels, and in which
regulation may be effective despite its predominantly non-binding forms” (Krisch
and Kingsburry, 2006, p. 1).
As such a case as global administrative law, the Basel Guidelines for Banking Supervision and
Adequacy is included.
Barr and Miller point out：
It is fair to say that Basel I is one of most successful international regulation regu-
latory initiatives ever attempted. It was adopted by the G-10 nations, applied by
them to all of their banks, and then promulgated by over 100 countries around the
world although implementation varies from country to country (Barr and Miller,
2006, p. 17). 
What seems to be particularly interesting is that convergence of the international account-
ing standards into IAS/IFRS likely resembles the Basel Guidelines and seems to possess the
same features as global administrative law. National regulators more than 100 countries as of
today around the world have adopted IAS/IFRS.  As their consequence, IAS/IFRS have now
become de facto global rules for international accounting. This seems to give a particular
meaning to an analysis of convergence of the international accounting standards.
The last but not the least important is the role played by the NGO, the IASC/IASB. Kees
Camfferman and Stephen A. Zeff traced on the lengthy process of how the IASC/IASB has
led IAS/IFRS to being recognized and adopted into the international accounting standards
through harmonization and convergence with other international accounting standards.  What
makes their work particularly important is that they illuminate what an important role the pri-
vate standards setter, the IASC/IASB, has become to play in setting the international account-
ing standards. The global rules for financial reporting are being set by the non governmental
organization in interactions with the international organization such as IOSCO, national regu-
lators such as the SEC and the CESR, and private standards setters, such as the FASB, and the
European Financial Reporting Advisory Group(the EFRAG)(Camfferman and Zeff, 2007).
They thus shed new light on what roles NGOs have become to play in global economic gover-
nance.
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II. The Origin of the Issue ― Reconciliation Requirement
When Daimler Benz registered with the SEC to trade on the New York Stock Exchange
(the NYSE) in 1993, it brought up an issue of double disclosures. Daimler had to file finan-
cial reporting in accordance with both the German Commercial Law and US GAAP. Since
then, EU had had to seek internationally acceptable accounting standards for EU companies
active in raising capital on the global financial markets(Sato, 2007-a, p. 7).  What EC had
sought to achieve through convergence of the international accounting standards was to get
the U.S. endorse IAS/IFRS through mutual recognition between EU-backed IAS/IFRS and US
GAAP and to get it drop its long-held reconciliation requirement to EU companies (Sato,
2007-b, footnote (14), p. 167).
The SEC required Daimler to reconcile its statement of benefit and pooling of interest to
US GAAP. They were reported in accordance with the German Accounting Standards.
Reconciliation process itself is so costly that it costs almost as much as making a whole new
financial report once again using US GAAP as the rules (Ozu, 2007, p. 71). EC came to rec-
ognize already in 1993 the urgent need to modernize EU approaches in accounting standards
to meet the challenge of financial globalization (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, p. 423).  In
addition to EU companies being increasingly drawn to the U.S. capital markets, there was
another factor pushing EC towards new EU strategy in accounting standards. After representa-
tives from EC began to attend the IASC board meeting in 1990, EC came to fear that through
“the US influence in IOSCO and the influence of IOSCO in the IASC,” EU would be placed
under US GAAP influence (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, p. 423). 
When IOSCO came to an agreement with the IASC on the conditions for its endorsement
of the latter in July 1995, “the Commission’s staff ” came to think that IOSCO “would in due
course endorse the IASC’s standards, opening the prospect of access to US capital markets
without the need to apply, or reconcile to, US GAAP” (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, p. 424).
EC felt the necessity to counter the dominance of US GAAP in the international accounting
standards and leaned towards IAS. This point was shown in the 1995 Communication, EU’s
major policy statement. EC showed its readiness to join the forces of international harmoniza-
tion of accounting standards which the IASC had carried.
Large European companies seeking capital on the international capital markets,
most often on the New York Exchange, are obliged to prepare a second set of
accounts . . . . This is . . . costly and constitutes a clear comparative disadvantage.
Moreover, it involves companies in conforming with [US GAAP] . . . , the number
of companies facing this problem is growing. . . . There is a risk that large compa-
nies will be increasingly drawn towards US GAAP (cited in Camfferman and Zeff,
2007, p. 425).
When European multinational enterprises, MNEs, brought up the reconciliation issue to
EC, it came to recognize that EU had achieved EU-wide harmonization of accounting stan-
dards among member states through mutual recognition by EU Accounting Directives but that
its accounting standards were still short of the level the U.S. required and were unable to meet
European MNEs’ growing need to raise capital on global financial markets (Ozu, 2007,p. 71).
European MNEs had grown up too big to remain in EU financial markets in seeking their cap-
ital for growth. They were increasingly turning towards global financial markets. If EU failed
to meet their needs, they would desert EU financial markets, rendering them being localized
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(Ozu, 2007,p. 71). 
On June 7, 1995, Jens Røder, president of Federation of European Accountants1, FEA,
wrote to John Mogg, director-general of DGXV (internal markets). “There is a risk that finan-
cial reporting in Europe will be dominated by requirements which result from a standard-set-
ting process [i.e. in the US] in which there is little likelihood that the views and interests of
Europeans preparers and users will be taken into account” (cited in Camfferman and Zeff,
2007, p. 424). As a way to cope with this, Røder asserted for adopting IAS, “The best way for-
ward is to permit these listed European companies which so wish to prepare their consolidated
financial statements in accordance with International  Accounting Standards, provided that the
role and influence of Europe within IASC are strengthened” (cited in Camfferman and Zeff,
2007, p. 424). Permitting EU companies to use IAS in filing consolidated accounts was
intended to make easy for them to enter international f inancial markets. Besides, EC
expressed that it would make efforts in support of the IASB and IOSCO in developing inter-
nationally endorsed accounting standards (Sato, 2007-a, p. 12).
On the reconciliation matter, EC sought to solve the reconciliation requirement through
mutual recognition with the U.S. but the latter had shown no interest in responding to EC
(cited in Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, p. 425).  For these reasons, EC singled out IAS as the
means to counter U.S. predominance in the international accounting rules and to meet urgent
need for European companies above.
Of the various international bodies working on accounting standards, for the time
being only the IASC is producing results which have a clear prospect of recognition
in the international capital markets within a time scale which corresponds to the
urgency of the problem (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, pp. 425-426). 
“By the spring of 1996,” Mogg made commitment to realizing the use of IAS by EU
companies in their consolidated accounts. He also took actions to bring EU member states
into supporting EU policy of this. All were aimed at “fending off the domination of US
GAAP” (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, p. 426). Further pressure mounted on EC toward adopt-
ing IAS when the number of EU companies listed on either the NYSE or the NASDAQ large-
ly grew from about 50 in 1990 to 250 in 1998. Its “cumulative market capitalization” reached
about $300 billion (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, p. 428). In addition, Germany and Austria
enacted the legislations. They allowed their companies to use internationally accepted
accounting standards in consolidated accounts, as long as they abided by the EU Directives.
Internationally accepted standards were here meant IAS and US GAAP (Camfferman and
Zeff, 2007, p. 428).  This caused the serious concern to EC because “[w]ithin the
Commission, a requirement for all listed companies to use IASC standards began to be seen
as the most effective way of stopping US GAAP.” Therefore, in May 1999 Action Plan of the
Commission, “the Commission referred only to the use of IASC standards and did not even
mention US GAAP” (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, p. 429).  
Later in June 2002, Karel Van Hulle, head of unit, EC, clearly stated above points as EU’s
reasons for adopting IAS. First of all, capital markets had grown up. In order for EU to keep
up with this trend, it needed to integrate the European capital markets under “common”
accounting standards for Europe. The current level of accounting harmonization in Europe
through EU Accounting Directives met only “a minimum level” in harmonization. But EU had
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1 Most of titles of persons appearing in this article are then titles. 
not to seek for its own set of accounting standards” (Hulle, 2002, p. 2). It would only result in
setting up regional accounting standards of another one, and only fail to match current global-
ization in financial markets and lead to making less easy for EU companies to raise capital on
international capital markets (Hulle, 2002, p. 2).
Rather, by adopting IAS/IFRS EU-widely, EU could bring its financial markets to the
international standards with a leap in terms of accounting standards. IAS/IFRS would not only
fit better the common markets and the common currency of EU by providing them with
another economic infrastructure, the common accounting standards, but also would enable EU
companies to be better equipped in raising capital on third country markets with financial
reporting better in comparability, transparency and disclosures. These seem to be the points
Hulle made in his announcement.
III. EU Strategy for Eliminating US GAAP Reconciliation Requirement–
Adopting IAS
In May 2000, IOSCO endorsed IAS and the IASC and asked securities regulators of
member countries to allow foreign companies to use IAS as the rules for financial reporting to
raise capital in their financial markets. Right after this, in June 2000, EC made a proposal to
European Parliament and Council of Ministers to require all EU listed companies to use IAS
as the rules for their financial reporting. In response, European Parliament enacted it in July
2001 and made the use of IFRS required to all EU listed companies from 2005 onwards. This
was the big push to bringing IFRS to the strong contending position vis-à-vis US GAAP for
the international accounting standards.
EC raised three points for adopting IAS. Among them, there was an increased likelihood
that IAS would become an internationally accepted system for accounting standards. IOSCO’s
endorsement of IAS was the reason for this. Two more reasons were raised. First, EC showed
its preference of IAS over US GAAP. For its reason, it said that IAS fit better European envi-
ronments because they are principles-based and this would leave more flexibility to countries
adopting them (Hulle, 2002, p. 3).  Second, this seems to be very important. US GAAP are the
U.S. accounting standards. They are under the U.S. control and EU has no way to exert any
influence upon them. On the other hand, EU can participate in the IASB and can contribute to
its formulation of accounting standards together with other member countries (Hulle, 2002, p.
3). This third point seems to be critically important for EU’s maneuvering to the U.S. over the
reconciliation issue. 
Since EU officially required all EU listed companies to use IAS from 2005 onwards, its
adoption of IAS meant that EU would incorporate IAS into the EU Law. For this purpose,
“endorsement” process had to be put in place before their incorporation into the EU law. For
its smooth adoption, EU put in place two organizations. They got involved in this process as
endorsement mechanism and played key roles as sources of EU’s power. One is the
Accounting Regulatory Committee which is composed of securities regulators from EU mem-
ber countries and is chaired by EC. (This organization seems to have been later renamed as
the Committee of European Securities Regulators, the CESR). This committee examines regu-
latory aspects in endorsing IAS into the EU law (Hulle, 2002, p. 3). As is analyzed in later
part, this committee’s importance, however, seems to come from its role of equivalency
assessment of third country GAAP, namely, US GAAP, Canada GAAP, and Japan GAAP. Its
equivalency assessment critically impacted upon them, pushing them towards adoption of
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IAS/IFRS. 
The other is the EFRAG which is a non-governmental organization and is composed of
wide range of representatives. This group covers technical aspects in the endorsement mecha-
nism. Both organizations engage in close communication with the IASB with regard to its
ongoing projects of developing IFRS rules and convey their support for or concerns on the
projects. They will endorse newly adopted accounting standards by the IASB each by each
(Hulle, 2002, p. 3).
Furthermore, the EFRAG makes close contacts with the IASB on its project currently
underway prior to the IASB’s adoption and expresses its views on the project. It also makes
advices to EC after the IASB’s adoption of a new accounting standard whether it should adopt
the new one or not (Tsujiyama, 2006, p. 5; Hulle, 2002, p. 4). In this sense, EU’s adoption of
IFRS is not full adoption. But it adopts new standards after reviewing them, following their
releases from the IASB (Kawanishi, 2008, p. 14 and Tsujiyama, 2007, p. 002). Considering
this advisory scheme of the EFRAG being in place, such probability is not ruled out that even
if the IASB adopts certain new standard, it may not be adopted by EC when the EFRAG rec-
ommends not doing so ( Tsujiyama, 2006, p. 5). As such a case, there is a rule on emission
right (IFRIC No. 3). The IASB approved it and made it public in December 2004. But later,
the IASB withdrew it when it became clear that the IASB could not likely get its approval
from EC because the EFRAG had shown concern to it. Thus, “EU has a casting vote on the
IASB’s standard setting” (Tsujiyama, 2006, p. 10).  Thus, EC got foot on the IASB to exert its
influence on IASB’s standard setting process.
IV. Network Externalities Analysis
i. The Katz–Shapiro Model
In analyzing a consumer’s decision making in purchasing a technology product under the
circumstance where network externalities exist, Katz and Shapiro consider two-period game, t
=1, 2. In the game, a consumer makes a decision over which type of technologies, A or B, he
should purchase. His decision focuses on how he can make his decision optimal in such a way
as he can extract larger value deriving from the network externalities that the technology he is
going to purchase will have, when all the volume of that technologies sold both in period 1
and in period 2 are added up together. In order to do this, first-period consumers should take
into calculation how second-period consumers make purchase decisions because the value of
first-period consumers purchasing one type of technology, either A or B, in period 1 depends
on how many consumers purchase the same technology in period 1 and in period 2 altogether
as the one first-period consumers purchase in period 1.  
Further more, they can predict that second-period consumers similarly make their pur-
chase decisions optimal, given the decisions of others in period 1. In other words, second-peri-
od consumers have to take into calculation the size of each technology group and have to
choose the technology whose size of technology group is larger than the other one when its
total volume of technologies sold both in period 1 and 2 are added up together. The larger the
size of one technology group is, the larger the network externalities effect which consumers
purchasing that technology can extract from their purchase of it is.
Shapiro and Katz present their model:
First-period consumers rationally forecast second-period sales in order to make
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their purchase decisions. First-period consumers recognize that the consumption
decisions of second-period buyers must be optimal given the pattern of first-period
purchases. . . . Hence, we begin our analysis by considering the purchasing deci-
sions of the N2 consumers who choose technologies in period 2. We look for a Nash
equilibrium in second-period technology choices, where each second-period con-
sumer makes his technology choice taking the purchasing decisions of all other
(first-and second-period) consumers as given. For a network to have positive sec-
ond-period sales in equilibrium it must be the case that no consumer purchasing
that technology wants to switch to the other technology. For technology A, this con-
dition is v(x1+x2) – p2 ≥ v(y1+y2+1) －q2, or  v(x1+x2) – v(y1+y2+1) ≥δ2.  For technol-
ogy B, the condition is v(x1+x2+1) – v(y1+y2) ≤δ2
Given that v(・) is an increasing function, these two conditions cannot be sat-
isfied simultaneously. Therefore, one technology or the other will dominate in the
second period: either x2 = 0 or x2 = N2. A similar argument shows that all first-peri-
od consumers will purchase the same technology as one another (Katz and Shapiro,
1986, pp. 826-827).
Here, two technologies are incompatible with each other. Let “xt and yt denote the quanti-
ties of technologies A and B, respectively, that are sold in period t.”  x1 is the quantity of tech-
nology A sold in period 1. x2 is the quantity of technology A sold in period 2. y1 is the quantity
of technology B sold in period 1. y2 is the quantity of technology B sold in period 2. p1 and p2
are the prices of technology A in the first-period and in the second period, respectively. q1 and
q2 are the prices of technology B in the first period and in the second period, respectively. δ
is “the discount for technology B relatively to A during period t.” Consumers are assumed to
be “homogeneous in that all of them have the same benefit function v(・).” It is also assumed
that “all period t consumers make purchases, yt = Nt – xt.” Nt is the number of consumers in
period t. And “[a] consumer who purchases technology A in period t derives gross benefits of
v (x1 + x2 ) and net benefits (or surplus) of v(x1 + x2) – pt. The corresponding values for a con-
sumer who purchases technology B in period t are v (y1+y2) and v(y1 + y2) – qt” (Katz and
Shapiro, 1986, p. 826).
The equation of v(x1 + x2 ) –P2 ≥ v(y1 + y2 + 1) – q2, or v(x1 + x2) – v(y1 + y2 + 1)≥δ2
shows the value obtained by subtracting purchasing technology B’s net benefit from purchas-
ing technology A’s net benefit and shows that the subtracted value of purchasing technology
A’s net benefit is larger or equal to technology B’s discount advantage. If this condition holds,
consumers’ purchase decisions of technology A in period 1 and in period 2 are optimal and
their strategy of this is the best response, given others’ purchase decisions. Therefore, to all
consumers, purchasing technology A becomes the equilibrium in period 2. In the Katz and
Shapiro model, “[t]he second-period outcome depends on a comparison of technology A’s
installed-base advantage . . . and technology B’s price advantage, δ２” (Katz and Shapiro,
1986, p. 827).
What seems to be very important with respect to convergence of international accounting
standards is Katz’ and Shapiro’s following remarks: “Our analysis supports the conventional
view that the technology that is superior today has a strategic, first mover advantage: it can
become locked in as the standard” (Katz and Shapiro, 1986, p. 825).  In other words, the supe-
rior technology jumps in to take “a first mover advantage” in period 1. Then consumers will
purchase the superior technology in period 2 because the superior technology has already got
a larger share of market in period 1. By purchasing the technology which has the larger share
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of market added up both in period 1 and period 2, consumers can extract larger benefit of net-
work externalities.
ii. Conceptual Application of the Katz-Shapiro Model to an  Analysis of EU Strategy
(1) Technical Adjustments
How can the Katz-Shapiro model be conceptually applied to an analysis of EU strategy to
remove US GAAP Reconciliations? Suppose technology A is here EU-backed IAS/IFRS.
And suppose technology B is US GAAP. And we also suppose that IAS/IFRS are superior to
US GAAP. What are implications in reality?  Are these assumptions supported in the actual
situations? As reasons for adopting IAS, EC raised two points, as mentioned in earlier part.
First, in setting accounting standards, IAS takes principles-based approach in comparison with
US GAAP’s rules-based one. EC said that principles-based approach is more flexible and is
better suited to fit EU environments than US GAAP’s rules-based one is. Second, EC said that
it can participate in the IASB and make contribution to IAS together with other member coun-
tries but that it can exert no influence upon US GAAP which are under the US control. To
other countries in planning to adopt international accounting standards, these two points can
be applicable as the reasons for considering IAS to be superior. Third, this seems to be most
important. IAS have been originally developed for convergence of international accounting
standards to cope with the growing need of financial globalization. 
Given the environments under which IAS were surrounded, if they had been given any
big push, they would have certainly gained momentum to sustain their growth to the interna-
tional accounting standards.  What happened in reality was just like this.
With regard to technology B’s discount advantage, US GAAP seem to have had not much
advantage relatively to IAS/IFRS. It is said that “for developing countries, since [financial]
markets remain undeveloped, it is apparently less costly to adopt international standards rather
than to develop their own standards on their own initiative” (Nishikawa, 2007, p. 45). It is also
said that “by adopting IFRS, these adopting countries can not only obtain ‘IFRS brand’ but
also can largely reduce cost in developing financial reporting standards” (Tsujiyama, 2006,
pp. 8-9). These suggest either that adopting IFRS is cheaper than adopting US GAAP or that
their price difference seems to be negligible, if there exists. If we remove technology B’s price
advantage, what matters in choosing between the two technologies for consumers is the differ-
ence in their sizes of networks.
In the Katz-Shapiro model, all consumers purchase either technology in period 1 and in
period 2. They are assumed to have “a completely inelastic demand for one unit of the good in
period t” (Katz and Shapiro, 1986, p. 826). This assumption should be applied to the case with
flexibility here. If country A adopts either IAS/IFRS or US GAAP in period 1, it is more like-
ly for country A to continue using them in period 2 without any further purchase decision.
This continuous use of the technology in period 2 which country A adopted in period 1 should
also be considered a decision. Two more factors need flexibility. First, what certain country is
actually switching is from its domestic standards to either IAS/IFRS or US GAAP. Second,
among about 150 member countries of the IASB, nearly 50 countries have not adopted
IAS/IFRS yet in the period under study. It indicates that among these 50, a considerable num-
ber of countries have made no decisions in periods 1 and 2. We interpret this with flexibility,
too. What matters most in this analysis is which one is gaining the majority between
IAS/IFRS and US GAAP among these countries which have adopted either IAS/IFRS or US
GAAP.
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(2) Analysis of the Case with the Kats-Shapiro Model
Setting Period 1 and Period 2
With respect to decision periods, period 1 is set here from 2000 to 2005. Period 2 is set
from 2006 to 2009. Following IOSCO’s endorsement of IAS of May 2000, EC made the pro-
posal to the European Parliament and Council of Ministers in June 2000 that all listed EU
companies should adopt IAS to file consolidated accounts from 2005 onwards.  It was enacted
in July 2002(EU Regulation 1606/2002). In response to this, many countries adopted IFRS
expecting that all EU countries would be regulated to use IFRS from 2005 onwards and that
IFRS would become the predominant network in the international accounting standards.  In
addition, in 2000, the restructuring of the IASC was ratified in pursuit of higher objective,
convergence of the international accounting standards, by the IASC member bodies
(Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, p. 347).  It was said that the year 2000 was a “pivotal year in the
history of the IASC” (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, p. 347). 
Period 2 is set here from 2006 to 2009.  The EU Regulation above also regulated that
non-EU companies had to use the accounting standards equivalent to the EU-adopted IFRS in
financial reporting to raise capital on EU financial markets from 2007 onwards and that other-
wise they would be excluded from EU markets (Kurosawa, 2007, p. 37 ; Okino, 2006, pp.
855-856 and p. 863).  This deadline was postponed by two years to 2009. This put pressure
upon non- IFRS-adopted countries, especially, the U.S., Japan and Canada, towards conver-
gence with IFRS. This pressure grew increasingly larger after the CESR began equivalency
assessment of third country GAAP in June 2004 and made public its public draft of technical
advices to EC in July 2005. Upon receiving the advice from the CESR, EC made the decision
that it would postpone an application of the EU Regulation (EU Regulation 1606/2002) to
non-IFRS-adopted countries by two years to 2009.
Adopting IFRS as the Best Responding Strategy
As of November 2007, 151 countries had become members of the IASB, including semi-
member countries.  Here, we set N, the total number of countries adopting the international
accounting standards, to be 151. Among these 151 countries, from the analytical viewpoint
here, it matters how many countries have adopted IFRS.  
Up until 1987, the reality surrounding the IASC was that its standards had been adopted
only in developing countries. It had had “very little impact on the developed countries, espe-
cially in those with well-developed equity securities markets” (Camferman and Zeff, 2007, p.
293). To overcome this status of low international recognition of IAS, the IASC board thought
it vital to enter closer relationship with securities regulators, especially, their organization,
IOSCO, and to upgrade the level of IAS standards so that they could be considered to be the
credible standards for international harmonization.  Thus, the IASC board had engaged in
close collaboration with IOSCO and had completed a core set of standards in December 1998.
As had been agreed with IOSCO that upon their completion, IOSCO would endorse IAS, it
endorsed IAS in May 2000.
Since IOSCO’s membership had expanded from 20 in 1983, to 56 in 1990 and to 73 in
1995 (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, p. 295), its endorsement of IAS must have not only
enhanced their status as the credible international accounting standards but also must have
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meant to the IASC board that the number of countries adopting IAS would  largely expand
accordingly. In December 2002, International Forum on Accounting Development (IFAD)
made a survey about how far each country intended to make its standards converge with
GAAP (IFRS). Covering 59 countries, 56 countries were found intended to converge with
them (Yokoyama, 2007, p. 30). Among countries surveyed to intend to converge, Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Singapore, South Korea,
Switzerland, and the U.S. were included, together with countries such as Germany, France,
Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Iceland, Japan, and Saudi Arabia were only those
surveyed to be not intended to converge (Yokoyama, 2007, p. 30).  
In 2005, the number of countries which either required adoption of IFRS or permitted
using them reached more than 90 countries (Yokoyama, 2007, p. 47).  Thus, during period 1
from 2000 to 2005, the data available shows that 90 out of 151 IASB members and semi-
members adopted or permitted using IAS/IFRS. It is 59.6 percent. This can be interpreted that
EU’s July 2002 enactment of forced adoption of IAS to all listed EU companies from 2005
onwards must have pushed other countries including those outside EU into adopting IFRS.
Partly it was likely because the majority of others were doing so. And partly it was likely
because, given the majority of countries having adopted them in period 1, the rest of others,
too, were likely to do so in period 2 to maximize value from the network externalities effect
by joining the larger network group of the accounting standards.  
After 2005, as of January 2006, the number of countries either required to adopt IFRS or
permitted using them reached 100 (Tsujiyama, 2006, p. 8).  It was predicted that by 2011, the
number would reach 150 (Yamada, 2007, p. 88).  At the point of 2007, it was reported that the
number of countries having adopted IFRS was larger than the number of countries having
adopted US GAAP (Nomura, 2007, p. 119).
The expansion in the number of countries adopting IFRS suggests that EU had intention-
ally taken the first move to ensure its strategic lead in setting up the larger network of IFRS by
enacting the registration of its forced adoption to all listed EU companies from 2005 onwards
and locked in the lead to set IFRS as the international accounting standards.  This moves
shows the textbook resemblance of “a strategic, first-mover advantage” in network externali-
ties as suggested in the Katz and Shapiro model.
As the Katz-Shapiro model suggests, any country considering adopting the international-
ly accepted accounting standards by choosing either IAS/IFRS or US GAAP in period 1 had
to make its decision optimal, given others’ decisions in period 1. It also had to take into calcu-
lation that decisions in period 1 would affect others’ decisions in period 2. When any country
was making a decision to choose the accounting standards between IFRS and US GAAP in
period 2, it had to make its decision optimal by taking into calculation the total number of
countries adopting, for example, IAS/IFRS, in periods 1 and 2. In other words, if majority of
countries were going to adopt IAS/IFRS in period 1, it probably predicted that in period 2,
too, the majority of countries were also going to adopt IFRS and that accordingly it could
make its decision optimal by choosing IFRS in period 2. Then, backward logic follows like
this: Given the number of countries choosing IFRS was larger in period 2, it should adopt
IFRS in period 2 to make his decision optimal, taking into calculation others’ decisions in
both periods 1 and 2. Furthermore, he should adopt IAS/IFRS in period 1, too, if the majority
of countries were going to adopt them in periods 1 and 2.
The year 2005 was decisively the turning point. Those countries which adopted IFRS,
following EU’ enactment of forced adoption of IAS of July 2001 were Austria, Belgium,
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Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Luxemburg, and UK. Non EU countries
joined them. They were Australia, Philippines and Switzerland. Hong Kong, Russia, and
China were also reported to be taking positive steps towards adopting IFRS (Yokoyama, 2007,
pp. 25-26).
V. Impact of Equivalency Assessment upon the U.S.
i. Background
With the endorsement by IOSCO of IAS of May 2000, IAS had got a status as at least the
emerging global standards. It then came to be closed up how they could be put into use as the
international rules. The IASC had pursued so far harmonization of accounting standards in the
world. This objective had to be elevated into one step further and more ambitious one, conver-
gence. Through convergence process, differences between IAS and other accounting stan-
dards, especially, US GAAP, should be reduced so that IAS would be put into practical use as
the international standards. Thus, the IASC was reorganized into the International Accounting
Standard Board, the IASB, for this purpose in April 2001 (Kato, 2007, p. 53).  IAS were
renamed International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS, after 2001, accordingly. 
When IOSCO agreed with the IASC board on its future endorsement of IAS on July 11,
1995, the SEC expressed official support in April 1996 to the IASC’s project to develop a core
set of standards to meet IOSCO’s endorsement conditions. It attached three conditions for the
SEC‘s endorsement to IAS. First, they should include a core set of standards. Second, the core
set should be comprehensive, fair, and relevant. They must also be comparable, transparent, of
high quality and must provide complete disclosures. Third, they must be strictly interpreted
and applied (Koga and Igarashi, 2002, p.340 and p. 343). If these conditions were met, the
SEC expressed its intention to allow foreign companies to use IFRS to file financial reporting
in the U.S (Koga and Igarashi, 2002, p. 343). 
The SEC had traditionally taken very cautious attitude to IAS. For example, when
IOSCO came to agree with the IASC on the endorsement conditions above, World Accounting
Report reported it as an epoch making event to IAS:
. . . it sets a timetable leading to worldwide use of IASC standards; by clear IOSCO
endorsement it implies a major breakthrough in gaining US acceptance of IASC
standards ―and challenges the SEC to deny this; it tells multinationals looking for
access to use of financial markets that a move to use of IASC standards will pro-
vide access in the medium term, without the embarrassments suffered by Daimler
Benz of US GAAP reconciliations. . . . (cited in Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, pp.
327-328). 
The SEC withheld any further commitment, different from that of IOSCO. It insisted on
seeing results of the IASC’s project to develop a set of core standards (Camfferman and Zeff,
2007, p. 324). 
There was a reason for the stricter conditions the SEC set for endorsement.  It largely
derived from domestic concern. The SEC feared that if it allowed less stricter international
standards, it might trigger demand for lower conditions in U.S. domestic standards:
[T]he SEC was especially guarded because it knew that if it were to allow foreign
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registrants to adopt IASC standards that were more flexible and yielding (for exam-
ple, with more options and fewer required disclosures) than US GAAP without a
reconciliation  requirement, it could not prevent US registrants from likewise
adopting IASC standards by switching from US GAAP (Camfferman and Zeff,
2007, p. 324). 
However, the U.S. had also been keenly aware of the impact of financial globalization and
its need to work for international harmonization through the IASC as well. The FASB had tra-
ditionally taken attitudes of indifference to the IASC until early 1990s, primarily placing its
role on securing comparability among financial reporting of U.S. companies in the U.S. finan-
cial markets. However, against the background of the growing financial globalization, the
need for cross-border comparability in financial reporting had rapidly increased in early
1990s. This led both the SEC and the FASB to seek more cooperation with the IASC. Dennis
Beresford, the FASB chairman since 1987, pushed the FASB into this direction, for example,
by agreeing “to have a representative of the FASB serve on the IASC’s Consultative Group
and attend meetings of the IASC Board as a guest” (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, p. 439).
Philip Lochner, the SEC chairman, expressed his personal view on the need for more active
participation in international harmonization in his speech of May 1991, criticizing the FASB:
“To the extent the U.S. appears to be simply stone stalling the [harmonization] process in
hopes that its own standards will prevail, other country must harmonize to the U.S. tune”
(cited in Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, p. 440). After 1994, the FASB began working with the
IASC to develop together some standards. In January 1995, the FASB stated in its “Plan for
the International Activities” that it “looks to the IASC as the ‘focal point’ for developing inter-
national standards” (cited in Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, p. 440).
Thus, the U.S. had both positive and negative attitudes to convergence, its need to cope
with financial globalization and the other need to make IFRS as stricter as possible to prevent
its GAAP from being loosened as a consequence of convergence.
Prior to EU enactment of compulsory adoption of IFRS, EU had accepted financial
reporting using US GAAP on EU markets through mutual recognition of each others’
accounting standards. However, under this arrangement of mutual recognition, EU companies
registered with the SEC were still obligated to reconcile to US GAAP in financial reporting
unless they use US GAAP, while U.S. companies using US GAAP listed on EU markets were
not obligated to reconcile to EU countries’ accounting standards. There was thus asymmetry
in requirement between US GAAP and EU countries’ accounting standards. US GAAP had
held the privileged status, while EU countries’ accounting standards had been placed in the
unequal status.  By taking advantage of EU-wide adoption of IFRS, with 490 million of popu-
lation, nearly two times the size of US population, EU created a huge scale advantage and bar-
gaining leverage based on it. That was equivalency assessment. Unless third country passes
equivalency assessment with EU-adopted IFRS in accounting standards, companies of its
country using accounting standards of the third county can have no access to EU financial
markets from 2007 onwards.
The accounting standards of the US, Japan, Canada had been subjected to equivalency
assessment of third country GAAP. They were only three liaison member countries among the
IASB that did not approve IAS/IFRS -based financial reporting on their financial markets and
were considered to be benchmarks of “third country” (Sato 2007, p. 167).  Equivalency
assessment changed distribution of power among them to EU advantage and this enabled EU
to force the U.S. to drop its asymmetrical claim of the reconciliation requirement later in 2008
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(Tsujiyama,2006, pp.6-7).
The first sign for cooperation on the US side came shortly after EU enactment of forced
adoption of IFRS of July 2002. This was therefore more likely response to the enactment
rather than equivalency assessment. It was “the Norwalk Agreement.” On October 29, 2002,
EU-backed IASB and the FASB, two of the most important standards setters in accounting,
came to agree to work together towards convergence between IFRS and US GAAP. It was a
significant step towards convergence partly because EU and the U.S. occupied 75 per cent of
the world financial market share when their markets were added up and partly because the
number of countries which had either already adopted or were going to adopt EU-backed
IFRS reached nearly 100 and the number of countries listed on the U.S. financial markets was
also large. In other words, both in terms of the number of countries using either one of these
standards and in terms of their added share of the world financial markets, they were over-
whelming. Against this background, EU-backed IASB and the FASB reached an agreement on
achieving convergence between their accounting standards (Nomura, 2007, p. 295). The pur-
pose of agreement was to improve their level of convergence by short-term projects and medi-
um and long-term projects. The latter aimed at removing differences still remaining at the
point of January 1, 2005 (Yamada, 2003, p. 88).  January 2005 was the original time table that
EU would exclude foreign companies not meeting equivalency requirement with EU-adopted
accounting standards from EU markets (Tsujiyama, 2006, p. 6). Thus, the agreement seems to
have been influenced by the forced adoption of IFRS by EU.
The U.S. itself seemed moving in the direction of a principles-based approach for another
reason as well which the IASB has been taking in setting IFRS. After the Enron case in which
Enron grossly window-dressed financial reporting, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was
enacted in July 2002 (Yokoyama, 2007, pp. 27 and 53).  It was pointed out that if Enron had
used IFRS, its window-dressing could have been made impossible. The new law ordered the
SEC to study transforming the U.S. financial system from the current rules-based one to the
principles-based one (Yokoyama, 2007, pp. 27 and 53).
The Enron case led the U.S. to think it necessary to review its accounting standards and
consequently led to the Norwalk Agreement in which the FASB would take a coordinated
approach, to a certain extent, to convergence of their standards. Before that, the U.S. consid-
ered its accounting standards to be of higher quality than that of IFRS.  While IFRS are the
common measures for un-specified many countries, US GAAP are the rules for the U.S., the
world top economy. This attitude seems to have undergone some changes after the Enron case.
There was other factor too which led the U.S. to the Norwalk Agreement. The U.S. changed its
long-standing attitudes of considering the IFRS to be of less quality. It rather came to think
changing and reforming IFRS in the U.S. interest. By taking up convergence projects with the
IASB, the U.S. likely thought that the FASB could exert influence upon the IASB into reform-
ing IFRS. After the agreement, convergence seems to have got momentum and have accelerat-
ed its tempo because the U.S. had long been the biggest obstacle of convergence (Fujimura,
Hiramatsu and Hatta, 2003, pp. 26-27).
ii. Equivalency Assessment
Canada was the first to shift to adopting IFRS in the face of pressure coming from equiv-
alency assessment of its GAAP by the CESR. The Canadian Accounting Standard Board,
AcSB, expressed on March 31, 2005 that it would converge its GAAP with IFRS and would
abolish its standards in five years (Yokoyama, 2007, p. 3). AcSB had long cared about main-
taining good relationship with the FASB but changed its traditional position. In June 2006,
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AcSB made public its implementation plan for a complete adoption of IFRS (Tsujiyama,
2006, p. 3).  In May, 2004, the CESR started equivalency assessment of US GAAP, Japan
GAAP, and Canada GAAP. It clearly impacted the SEC, too. At the national level, at around
the same time, June 2004, the U.S. started dialogue at the SEC-CESR level and asked EC to
continuously recognize US GAAP through mutual recognition as it had done so far
(Tsujiyama, 2006, p. 7).
At the same time, the U.S. responded to the real aim of the CESR’s equivalency assess-
ment. The SEC changed its position on the reconciliation requirement to foreign companies
and expressed its readiness to accept their financial reporting without reconciliations with the
target year set 2009, if they would be made in [full] accordance with IFRS. However, it also
said that it would carefully monitor IFRS’ enforcement process in the U.S. markets and judge
their practical adoptability as well as their quality (Tsujiyama, 2006, p. 7).
The SEC seemed to be further pressured into convergence with IFRS and eventually
allowing them. On April 23, 2005, only less than two months and half before the CESR was
scheduled to make a report to EC on equivalency assessment of third party GAAP, the SEC
Chairman William Donaldson and EC Commissioner Charlie MacGreeby expressed their
wish with regard to “the road map” of US GAAP convergence with IFRS, in which the U.S.
would remove the reconciliation requirement to foreign companies, which would be realized
at the latest by 2009 (Kato, 2006, p. 48).  Probably, reflecting these concessions the U.S. had
made, in the technical advices to EC the CESR made on July 5, 2005, it recognized US GAAP
as being equivalent to IAS/IFRS as a whole but asked the FASB as remedies to reduce differ-
ences in US GAAP over 19 topics.
Equivalency assessment by the CESR was closely related with progress in convergence
projects between the IASB and the FASB. This point was clearly revealed later by EC director
general in charge of internal markets Alexander Schaub at IOSCO conference in Frankfurt on
October 5, 2005. He indicated to consider postponing a conclusion of equivalency assessment
on US GAAP by two years to 2009. This was made on the assumption that EC and the SEC
would be able to agree that, in their projects to bring IAS/IFRS and US GAAP to conver-
gence, considerable progress would have been made between the IASB and the FASB to
achieve “[s]ufficient level” of convergence (Kato, 2006, p. 48).   He thus indicated that when
and what conclusion EC would make on equivalency assessment would be directly influenced
by how much progress would be made in the IASB–FASB convergence projects. While keep-
ing the card of equivalency assessment in hands, EC had likely put pressure on the SEC to
make progress in the convergence projects. It was quite natural for EC to do so, given the fact
that the FASB was under the influence of the SEC. 
IV. The U.S. Moves to Dropping Reconciliation Requirement and to Adopting IFRS
i. Convergence Goes Hand in Hand with Financial Globalization
On June 20, 2007, the SEC made the decision to permit foreign companies to stop recon-
ciling to US GAAP, from the 2008 fiscal year starting January 2008 (Nippon Keizai Shinbun
(hereafter NKS), August 22, 2007). The decision was made the official one in November
2007. It aimed at strengthening the competitiveness of the U.S. financial markets because the
reconciliation requirement had been the extra burden to foreign companies (NKS, June 22,
2007).  Therefore, the U.S. dropping of the requirement was said to be the one to “provide a
powerful boost for” IFRS (Noris, The International Herald Tribune (hereafter IHT), June 15,
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2007). Non U.S. companies using IFRS can now raise capital on the U.S. markets without the
reconciliation requirement. Furthermore, the SEC even moved in the direction to consider per-
mitting U.S. companies to similarly use IFRS (Noris, IHT, June 15, 2007 and NKS, August
12, 2007). 
The SEC had long been under growing pressure from the NYSE for adopting IFRS. The
NYSE had been lagging behind the LSE because of the SEC’s reconciliation requirement. The
LSE which went ahead of the NYSE in attracting foreign multinationals to its listing accepted
IAS, US GAAP, and through the principle of mutual recognition GAAP of other European
countries. It did not require foreign companies of these countries to reconcile their financial
reporting to UK GAAP. Because of this, the LSE had more foreign listings and had “larger
market capitalization” for foreign companies than the NYSE at the end of 1997. The NYSE
“once” thought that the SEC’s reconciliation requirement had made foreign multinationals less
accessible to the NYSE than to the LSE. Already in 1996, the NYSE turned to Senator Phil
Gramm, chairman of Securities Subcommittee which has oversight to the SEC, and success-
fully lobbied him for putting a provision on financial reporting to the bill of “the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act.” The provision which was added “charged the SEC to
move forward with its support for international standards with greater alacrity” (Camfferman
and Zeff, 2007, p. 336).  The SEC, on the other hand, raised as one of the reasons for its hesi-
tation the lack of the oversight authority by IOSCO or any regulatory group including itself
over the drafts which the IASC sets (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007 p. 337). 
At some point in time around 2005, likely being triggered by EC’s original schedule for
not allowing non EU companies to raise capital on EU financial markets unless they use IFRS
for financial reporting, such perception that IFRS was evolving into the solo standards of the
world had likely emerged among non EU countries. Over the three years after 2005 up until
early 2008, the number of countries having adopted or partially adopted IFRS jumped to more
than 100 countries (NKS, April 5, 2008). It was reported, “In addition to emerging economies
such as China and India, Canada and Australia have also adopted IFRS. More than 100 coun-
tries have adopted them and US GAAP have been apparently put in an inferior position”
(NKS, April 29, 2008). Thus, “more than 100 countries” seem to be the critical line to judge
the balance between IFRS and US GAAP. Balance of power between the two standards was
tipping against US GAAP.
The more the number of countries adopting IFRS expanded, the more financial globaliza-
tion likely accelerated, at least in people’s perception, if not in statistics. For example, Gerrit
Zalm, chairman of the IASB, said in an interview in April 2008 that if progress in bringing the
measurements [of the financial reporting] to convergence was made, it would boost up inte-
gration [of global financial markets]” (NKS, April 5, 2008). Logically speaking, issuing
stocks and listing them on exchanges will be accelerated at the financial markets where partic-
ipants use the same standards, IFRS. Transaction within the circle of the same measures,
IFRS, will be boosted up as the number of countries adopting IFRS expands because transac-
tion cost can be reduced for its larger scale merit. It is the effect of network externalities. On
the other hand, transaction at the financial markets outside the circle of the same measures
will dwindle because to make transaction at the markets with the different measures, US
GAAP, companies have to bear additional adjustment cost, i.e., reconciling their financial
reporting based on the majority measures to US GAAP, the minority measures.
Since convergence of the international accounting standards into IFRS accelerates finan-
cial globalization and financial globalization, on the other hand, demands convergence of the
international accounting standards, both seem to have gone hand in hand with each other. This
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created the fear among Americans that they were not only losing a battle in the convergence
game to EU but also their competitiveness of its financial markets was getting weakened.
When the number of countries adopting IFRS exceeded 100, it likely became felt that the
game was over and the U.S. had lost it. Zalm pointed out that “in the U.S. argument for per-
mitting U.S. companies to use IFRS is growing” and that “the U.S. move of this reflects the
concern that if it sticks to its own rules [US GAAP], it loses its competitiveness as the [inter-
national] financial markets and it might run the risk of being left behind the world trend.” He
also said that “China introduced the accounting standards based on IFRS into its standards
and India, too, put forth the plan to fully adopt IFRS from 2011 onwards”; that “these coun-
tries need to attract investment money from the advanced countries of Japan, the U.S. and
Europe to keep growing”; that “they have to upgrade transparency of their financial reporting
of their companies to earn better reputation for their financial markets”; and that “if emerging
economies disclose their financial reporting using IFRS, they can improve their reliability as
markets for investment and can get capital at low cost” (NKS, April 4, 2007).  He thus indicat-
ed that money of the world flows more along the line of IFRS-adopted markets after the num-
ber of countries adopting them exceeded hundred. The rapid increase in number of IFRS-
adopting countries likely had had the critical impact upon the SEC’s decision to move to drop-
ping the reconciliation requirement. 
Though the SEC permitted foreign companies to stop reconciling their financial report-
ing to US GAAP, it still attached one critical condition that “it would accept filings using
international standards only if they complied fully with the standards as issued by the board.”
EU had not adopted part of one standard of IFRS. It is “part of one rule, on derivative account”
(Noris, IHT, April 29, 2008). 
ii. The SEC Moves to Adopting IFRS
In addition to the pressure which EC had put on the SEC through equivalency assessment
as well as the growing number of IFRS-adopting countries, two other factors also likely
pushed the SEC to moving to adopt IFRS. Firstly, EC set its negotiating objective at a realistic
level, i.e., mutual recognition of their accounting standards and removal of the U.S. reconcilia-
tion requirement to EU companies along the road map to convergence set in the Norwalk
Agreement.
Secondly, in order to achieve the above objective, EC took very flexible approach to the
SEC in which the latter could get its basic positions on the requirements of the international
accounting standards well taken through joint works between the IASB and the FASB in
bringing their standards to convergence. For example, Schaub also said on the same occasion
of May 2005 that the equivalence of US GAAP to IFRS did not mean that they had to perfect-
ly accord with each other but that their convergence had to reach at the sufficient level, that
their standards had to be applied in the uniformed way, and that close cooperation between the
two regulators had to be established (Kato, 2006, p. 48). Ikuo Nishikawa, former Japanese
representative to the IASC, also said that after EU’s required adoption of IFRS by EU compa-
nies from 2005 onwards, convergence was in reality meant to bring IFRS and US GAAP close
enough to make their mutual recognition in substance possible (Nishikawa, 2007, p. 45). In
other words, EC was likely ready to take flexible approach to the SEC as long as the mutual
recognition of the two standards, i.e., the U.S. removal of the reconciliation requirement, could
be attained. The SEC probably judged that it could reduce IFRS’ differences with US GAAP
as much as possible to a point where they might be acceptable.
On August 27, 2008, the SEC made a proposal to permit U.S. companies to use IFRS and
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set out road map to it: “it would consider requiring large American companies to move to the
international standards for their 2014 financial statement, with smaller ones required to make
the move in 2015 and the smallest – but the largest number – allowed to delay until 2016”. It
was reported that the final decisions with regards to those companies “would be made in
2016” (Norris, IHT, August 29, 2008).  Thus, the SEC itself largely moved to adopting IFRS
as the rules.  This was the exactly what the Katz-Shapiro model predicts:“For a network to
have positive second-period sales in equilibrium it must be the case that no consumer purchas-
ing that technology wants to switch to the other technology. . . . one technology or the other
will dominate in the second period” (Katz and Shapiro, 2007, p. 827). 
The SEC chairman Christopher Cox was reported saying at the press conference that
IFRS seemed to look like better than US GAAP in many aspects such as the standard with
respect to special purposes companies. It was interpreted to be the “declaration of defeat” of
US GAAP. Several reasons were raised for this proposal of the SEC. First, “there was a grow-
ing voice of concern among financial experts of the Republican Party members that the U.S.
might be weakening its competitive position as the global financial center”. They derived
from the decline in raising capital by foreign multinationals on the U.S. financial markets and
the decline of U.S. companies’ share in M&A. Second, “financial firms on the Wall Street
have preferred that the U.S. will switch the accounting standards from its own US GAAP to
IFRS”. “They have been making business in cross-border mergers and international financing.
When U.S. companies and foreign ones are merged but still they have to use the different
accounting standards, it would negatively affect in making [integrated] managerial judgment
of these merged companies” and “would also become obstacles in running them as a system”
(NKS, April 29, 2008).
The reasons raised above are exactly what the logic of network externalities predicts. As
Zalm suggested, world money flows along the same international accounting standards, IFRS.
Between and among the same standards, transaction costs are cheaper than transaction costs
between the different international accounting standards. 
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